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IT'S ABOUT TIME
DAVID FRISCH*

This Article critically evaluates the view widely held by courts that
contract claims for lost leisure or personal time do not justify
compensation. The thesis of this Article is that while the conventional
judicial wisdom may be correct about some forms of nonpecuniary loss, it
is entirely wrong regarding lost time. After setting aside assumptions, I
show that traditionalarguments against this form of recovery are deeply
flawed Most importantly, I rely on the recognition of hedonic damages by
forensic economists to debunk the myth that loss of time is no more than an
everyday aspect of life not worthy of judicial attention. This Article
demonstrates the relevance of lost time claims to remedial policy generally,
showing that the denial of these claims undermines the twin remedial
policies of fairness and efficient deterrence. Finally, I reject the various
hedonic models that have been used to measure leisure time on the ground
that they are either administratively cumbersome or are anti-egalitarian,
andpropose a model that eliminates these two deficiencies.
The lack ofJudicial and academic attention given to lost personaltime
claims is somewhat astonishing, considering its prevalence in legal
contexts. This trend suggests that the traditional common law position
against the recovery of nonpecuniary damages generally has a powerful
hold on our judicial intuition. A reevaluation of at least one aspect of this
slighted area of law would be goodpublic policy, and it's about time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While people seldom agree on any proposition without reservation, few
would take issue with the old saying that "time is money."' Implicit in this
saying is the observation that our personal time is the ultimate scarce
resource and should not be squandered without receiving something of
value (such as money or enjoyment) in return.2 In conventional economics,
time is treated as a commodity to be bought and sold at will.3 However,
time is much more than a flow of future income payments. The
irreplaceable hours, minutes, and seconds of our lives are used to give and
receive love, participate in activities that give us pleasure, and engage in
many other life elements that most everyone would agree are important.
There are many ways that people exhibit information about how they
value their time. Some of the most obvious examples come in the form of
transportation decisions. Travelers regularly pay a considerably higher price
for an airline ticket rather than taking a less expensive, but slower, train ride
to the same location. Likewise, commuters often choose to drive on a toll
road when they can reach the same destination by a free, but less direct
route. Employment relationships supply yet another common example. If a
worker is normally expected to be at work and receives payment for only
eight hours per day, the employer may find it necessary to provide
additional compensation, in the form of overtime pay, to obtain more of the
worker's time.
We might, therefore, intuitively expect that civil recourse in private law
would be readily available against those who wrongfully cause us to lose
time by breach of contract or otherwise. Although nonpecuniary damages
are a regular feature of compensation claims in contract,4 with few

1. The etymology of this phrase is obscure, at best. We know that Benjamin Franklin
used it in his ADVICE TO A YOUNG TRADESMAN (1748) ("Remember that time is money. He
that idly loses five shillings' worth of time loses five shillings, and might as prudently throw
five shillings into the sea."). However, there is a citation slightly earlier than Franklin's that
appears in the Oxford English Dictionary, culled from AMBROSE PHILLIPS, THE FREETHINKER 128 (1723) ("In vain did his Wife inculcate to him, That Time is Money: He had too
much wit to apprehend her ...").
2. We are all time-limited. That is, a person has a limited quantity of time equal to 24
hours in a day. We all crave more time. Suffice it to say that if singer-songwriter Jim Croce
had succeeded in saving "Time in a Bottle," the value of that bottle would have been
priceless. JIM CROCE, Time in a Bottle, on You DON'T MESS AROUND WITH JIM (ABC
Records 1972).
3. See, e.g., Kurt V. Krueger, John 0. Ward & Gary R. Albrecht, Introduction to the
Whole-Time Concept, 14 J. FORENSIC ECON. 3, 5 (2001) (noting that "money, time, and

goods can be equally substituted for each other").
4. Although the primary purpose of this Article is to suggest that lost personal time
that results from a breach of contract is a real loss and that the aggrieved party should be
compensated for such a loss, nonpecuniary damages recoverable in tort will not be ignored.
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been largely ignored by legal5 commentators
exceptions, these claims have
•
and have received merely cursory treatment by courts. First, let us
understand what is meant by nonpecuniary damages. In my mind, these are
damages that compensate for losses that are not generally thought of as
being susceptible to measurement in purely economic terms, such as mental
suffering, inconvenience, loss of time, or humiliation.
One might argue that there are two general categories of nonpecuniary
damage claims that may arise in breach of contract cases. First, there are
claims for some type of psychic harm. These are the emotional distress
cases, regardless of what other descriptive label a court or litigant may
choose to employ. Perhaps the term "psychic harm" might be a
classification that better serves as a new and useful grouping of cases in
which judges would strive for consistency and litigants would feel
empowered to look for precedents. Instead, psychic harm currently does not
seem to be a recognized category, and it is simply a feature common to
many cases bearing different labels. Second are so-called claims for lost
time. The distinguishing feature of these claims is their temporal, not
psychic, nature. For some defined period of time, the aggrieved party has

5. See John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based
Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1565, 1578 (1986) ("Nonpecuniary losses, such as inconvenience, annoyance, and emotional
distress, although likely real in many situations, are rarely recognized."). The most
prominent exception involves the right of the aggrieved party to recover damages for
emotional distress. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981)
("Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily
harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a
particularly likely result."). Typically, emotional distress damages are only awarded in death
and burial cases, in cases where the breach is "accompanied by public embarrassment... of
the plaintiff' or in cases where the breach results in physical harm to the plaintiff, as in
contracts for medical services. See Sebert, supra, at 1584-85; Douglas J.Whaley, Payingfor
the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK
L. REv. 935, 940 (1992).
6. In continental doctrine, this type of loss is known by the term "dommage moral,"
that is, damage of a moral nature that does not affect a tangible part of a person's patrimony.
Saul Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977). Such recovery is recognized by
statute in Louisiana, a jurisdiction whose law is based in part on civil law.
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, because of
its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the
circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract,
the obligor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would cause
that kind of loss. Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be
recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure, to aggrieve the
feelings of the obligee.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1998 (1985).
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lost the opportunity to engage in an alternative activity; it is in this
opportunistic sense that time has been lost. This Article engages lost time
from the perspective of claims by individuals who, for one reason or
another, are forced to spend their personal or leisure time in undesirable
ways, and for which no lost economic opportunity can be readily identified.
Claims of this sort can be described as "lost personal time."
It should be apparent that not all lost time claims will necessarily fall
into this category. Consider, for example, the question of whether a
business buyer can recover for the time spent by its employees on tasks
made necessary by the seller's failure to deliver conforming goods. In
Keller v. InlandMetals All Weather Conditioning,Inc.,7 the buyer rightfully
rejected a dehumidifier delivered by the seller and sought to recover
damages for the time its employees spent gathering temperature and
humidity data and transporting water samples for testing.8 The trial court
allowed this claim and awarded damages based on the employees'
respective hourly rates. 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed,
holding that these were incidental damages recoverable under U.C.C. § 2715(l).1° Here, the court was not dealing with a claim for nonpecuniary
damages; instead, the expense incurred in having employees do something
that they were not hired to do could easily be monetized and better
classified as a traditional incidental or consequential damages claim.
Some of the contexts, outside of statutory frameworks," in which
claims for lost personal time have been litigated include the "time and
effort" expended by those who are affected by data security breaches; 12 the
"inconvenience, aggravation, and distress" due to a service provider's delayX
in performance;13 or a breach of warranty by various types of sellers.

7. 76 P.3d 977 (Idaho 2003).
8. Id. at 979, 984.
9. Id. at 984.
10. Id. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) permits a buyer to recover reasonable expenses incurred in
the inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody of nonconforming goods and
any reasonable expense incident to the delay or breach. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1977).
11. Inasmuch as my larger goal is to suggest an approach to breach of contract cases, I
ignore for the time being areas of the law where legislative enactments dominate the
landscape. For a discussion of some of these enactments see infra notes 57-74 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d
492, 496 (Me. 2010) (holding that time and effort expended to avoid or remediate harm
caused by fraudulent charges or identity theft by those whose credit card information was
stolen was not a cognizable injury for which damages could be recovered under the law of
negligence or contract). For more on this case, see infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 322 So. 2d 802, 805 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975) (the court denied recovery of damages resulting from defendant's unreasonable
delay in repairing plaintiff's automobile because the principal object of the contract was
physical gratification or utility).
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There is also the "time lost" as a result of phone calls made to straighten out
discovered billing errors by a wireless communications provider. 15 And
then, there is the "inconvenience, loss of time, anxiety and frustration"
caused by being bumped as a result of flight overbooking. 16
These several examples begin to suggest that the challenge of lost
personal time claims is an urgent one. That confusion reigns is even evident
from the diverse terminology used to describe these claims. What, for
example, is the relationship between "lost time" and "inconvenience"? Is
"inconvenience" distinct from "distress"? Does it matter? Remarkably
enough, no commentator or judge has explained any of these cases with
reference to the usual litany of harms alleged. Because these harms share a
common currency (i.e., each refers to a reduction in the overall enjoyment
of life), discussions of nonpecuniary damages tend to use them
interchangeably, creating the appearance of a uniform problem when, in
fact, the specific harms may vary widely.
To put this observation in context, consider the court's opinion in
Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.17 The plaintiffs in this case were
passengers on a flight from London to San Francisco. 8 Following an
alleged mechanical problem and fuel shortage, the plane was diverted to
Vancouver, British Columbia, where it sat "on the tarmac for one hour and
fifteen minutes."' 9 After the passengers were finally permitted to
disembark, they were confined in a transit lounge for one hour and ten
minutes. 20 As a result of the delays, they then had no choice but to spend
the night in Vancouver. 21 This nightmare of a trip finally ended when their
plane landed in San Francisco, twenty-five hours after its scheduled
arrival.22 The plaintiffs claimed damages for "anxiety, exhaustion,
frustration, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish and physical
discomfort., 23 Although the court decided that "emotional distress" is not a
legally cognizable harm in the absence of economic or physical injury, it

14. Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 437 A.2d 417, 418, 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
15. See, e.g., Sisley v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P., 284 Fed. Appx. 463, 466 (9th Cir.
2008) (although the court expressed doubt whether the plaintiff had stated a cognizable
injury, it nevertheless reversed the district court's dismissal for want of Article III standing).
16. See, e.g., Lopez v. E. Airlines, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 181, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that although plaintiff suffered a delay of only three to four hours, he should be
compensated for the "inconvenience, delay and uncertainty").
17. 59 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
18. ld. at 987.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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had no qualms about permitting the plaintiffs to recover damages for
"inconvenience." 24 Why? The court's simple answer was that "time is
money, after all ....,25

What does this analysis tell us? The answer is that we need to bring
greater discipline to the analysis of nonpecuniary damage claims, and, by
doing so, reveal trends and tensions in the judicial enterprise that require
either a more deliberate or different response. Using, for example, the same
term-"inconvenience"--to express both a disruption in the plaintiffs
schedule of activities and the distress caused by that disruption is
misleading. People who experience emotional turmoil as a result of a
breach may, nevertheless, conduct their affairs as planned but with less joie
de vivre. Is this inconvenience or something else, such as emotional
distress? Whatever we may choose to call it, it is certainly not lost time.
Strictly speaking, even time spent by airline passengers on the tarmac, in an
airport lounge, or asleep in a hotel room is not time lost. Each passenger is
still experiencing life, but not in the manner she would have otherwise
chosen. Notwithstanding this quibble with the descriptive accuracy of
referring to these claims as "lost time" claims, the term is a useful way of
highlighting a shared feature of a set of cases. For this reason, I avoid the
temptation to suggest a different description.
With these opening comments in mind, I do not intend to engage the
broader debate about whether nonpecuniary damages may be recovered for
breach of contract generally. Rather, this Article explores the narrower
question of whether damages are appropriate to compensate for lost
hysshould be recognized. In so doing, I will
personal time. 26 I suggest that they
seek to clear a path for their acceptability by removing certain doctrinal and
theoretical impediments to such recognition.
This Article unfolds in two parts. In Part II, I consider in detail the
opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in In re Hannaford Bros.
Co. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation.27 This case is a paradigm
for the position that damages for lost personal time are non-recoverable,
and provides a useful lens through which to analyze the issue.28 From my

24. Id. at 994.
25. Id. Interestingly, the court suggests that the amount of compensation awarded to
each plaintiff should reflect what he or she was prevented from doing as a result of the flight
delay. Id. at 994 n.6. I argue later in this Article that this brand of discrimination is
inappropriate. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
26. While claims for psychic harm typically accompany claims for lost time, there are
significant differences between these two categories of claims that require separate
treatment. For one thing, there is no metric for measuring the value of the former; whereas,
this Article will suggest that there is a metric for the latter. See infra notes 211-21 and
accompanying text.
27. 4 A.3d 492 (Me. 2010).
28. See id. at 496 ("An individual's time, alone, is not legally protected from the
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perspective, the court's conclusion and reasoning unfortunately are
completely wrong. Understanding why this is so requires a much closer
look at the objections to recovery on which the court's opinion is based;
that will be the key task of Part III. I then conclude with a proposal for
determining the appropriate amount of an award for loss of personal time.
II. IN RE HANNAFORD BROS. CO. CUSTOMER
DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGA TION

A. Facts
The events between December 2007 and March 2008 that gave rise to
the litigation in Hannaford involved a breach of the computer systems of
the Maine-based grocery store chain.2 9 This led to a consolidated class
action brought by customers whose credit and debit card data became
compromised by the breach. 30 A significant legal obstacle that faced the
Hannaford plaintiffs was that, at the end of the day, few class members
actually sustained financial harm. 3' Importantly, even in those instances
where the thieves used the stolen debit or credit card information to make2
fraudulent charges, there was little or no out-of-pocket loss to the victims.
Consequently, the plaintiffs had to aver that they were harmed in some
other concrete way.33 And this they did. The plaintiffs claimed that they
were entitled to be reimbursed for their expended "time, energy and
expense" to ameliorate the financial disruption caused by the security
breach.34 Among other things, they had to take the necessary steps to
identify and contest the fraudulent charges, cancel their existing cards, and
deal with pre-authorized charges by registering new cards with online
sellers and other payees to whom pre-authorized payments were made.

negligence of others.").
29. Id. at 494.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. The Truth in Lending Act limits the liability of a consumer for
unauthorized charges to $50. Truth in Lending Act of 1968 § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)
(2006). Even the $50 charge is often waived by the issuer. See, e.g., Visa Security &
Protection, Zero Liability, VISAUSA, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa-security_pr
ogram/zero liability.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). The same $50 liability limitation is
also applicable to the unauthorized use of a debit card, provided the consumer reports the
loss of the card within a prescribed amount of time. See Electronic Fund Transfer Act of
1978 § 909, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2006).
33. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108,
115 (D. Me. 2009).
34. Id.at 116.
35.

Id.

764

TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 79:757

Accordingly, In re Hannafordcan be viewed as a lost personal time case,
pure and simple.
The defendants sought a dismissal of the claims of the named plaintiffs
whose data had been stolen but who had not suffered any out-of-pocket
losses as a result of the theft.36 Maine District Court Judge D. Brock
Homby initially granted the defendants' motion as to all but one of the
plaintiffs' claims, holding that consumers could not be compensated for
"the ordinary frustrations and inconveniences that everyone confronts in
daily life with or without fraud or negligence" because there was no way to
monetize such a claim.37
The plaintiffs then asked Judge Homby to reconsider his ruling, arguing
that it was by no means clear how Maine's highest court, if given the
opportunity, would decide the question of whether lost time is a legally
cognizable injury. 8 Judge Hornby agreed with the plaintiffs, and proceeded
to certify two questions of state law to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.39
The state's high court only addressed the following question:
In the absence of physical harm or economic loss or identity theft, do
time and effort alone, spent in a reasonable effort to avoid or remediate
reasonably foreseeable harm, constitute a cognizable injury for which
damages 4may
be recovered under Maine law of negligence and/or implied
0
contract?
The court's answer was an emphatic "No.'
B. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court Opinion
The state supreme judicial court's brief opinion
the context of examining whether damages for lost
recovered through the lens of what the court saw
categories. The court first considered the category

is best understood in
personal time can be
as a series of useful
of tort and the sub-

36. Id.at 115.
37. Id.at 134-35.
38. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 660 F. Supp. 2d 94,
97-98 (D. Me. 2009).
39. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 494
(Me. 2010). See also In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 198, 201 (D. Me. 2009) (certifying questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine).
40. In re Hannaford,4 A.3d at 494. The Supreme Judicial Court did not address the
second question, which was, "If the answer to question # 1 is yes under a negligence claim
and no under an implied contract claim, can a plaintiff suing for negligence recover damages
under Maine law for purely economic harm absent personal injury, physical harm to
property, or misrepresentation?"
41. Id. at 498.
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category of negligence.42 It was quick to point out that negligence provides
no recourse "for the typical annoyances or inconveniences that are part of
everyday life," and that damage claims for personal time are within this
category of non-compensable harms.4 3 Yet the court failed adequately to
articulate a coherent explanation for why this is so. It did suggest, however,
that recovery was denied because the loss in question could not be assigned
a value. 44 Thus, we are told that damages for lost time can be recovered if
the plaintiff alleges personal injury or property damage and if the loss can
be correlated to either earnings or earning opportunities (i.e., pecuniary
damages). 45 The court then continued with its categorization of tort claims.
In its view, the cases relied on by the plaintiffs that allowed recovery for
loss of time were distinguishable because many of them involved at least
one intentional tort.46 The court thus reasoned that "because liability is
often more extensive in cases of intentional torts than those in negligence,
intentional tort cases recognizing recovery for time and effort have little
bearing on our analysis.' 47 As well, it rejected the persuasive value of those
cases cited because they offered no guidance as to how the value of lost
time should be measured.48
Finally, the court turned its attention to the plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim. The analysis began with the recognition that "contract damages are
more restricted than compensatory damages for a tort' 4 9 and ended with the
court reiterating Judge Hornby's existential observation about the
frustrations and inconveniences of everyday life.50 Thus, those plaintiffs
who have suffered no direct financial loss are without a right of action
regardless of whether their claim is said to arise out of contract or tort.51

42. 4 A.3d at496.
43. Id.
44. See id. ("Because the time in question could be assigned a value... resulting from
personal injury or property damage, loss of time was a harm cognizable in negligence.").
45. Id.
46. Id. at 497 n.1; see, e.g., Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Me. 427, 431, 435 (1869) (false
imprisonment); Brown v. Watson, 47 Me. 161, 163 (1859) (nuisance).
47. 4 A.3d at497.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court makes this point by stressing that damages for emotional distress are
typically unavailable in a breach of contract action. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 498. This is a conclusion of real import. If case law is any indication, the
theft or loss of personal information after it has been shared with another is a growing
problem. In some cases, the information is obtained by hackers, see, e.g., Bell v. Acxiom
Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72477, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006); Belle Chasse Auto.
Care, Inc. v. Advanced Auto Parts, Inc., No. 08-1568, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25084, at *2
(E.D. La. March 24, 2009). Sometimes the computer itself is stolen, see, e.g., Randolph v.
ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007); Caudle v. Towers, Perrin,
Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Kahle v. Litton Loan
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT'S OPINION

The brief discussion of relevant legal doctrine in Hannaford is stronger
on rhetoric than analysis. This is a shame, because the fact pattern in the
case presents a wonderful opportunity for exploring the doctrinal issues
posed by a claim for damages for lost personal time, a subject that is far
more complex and interesting than the court's opinion implies. Let us put
some flesh on the bare bones of the opinion, and, in so doing, take a closer
look at the justifications for the limitations on liability that the court found
to be persuasive.
A. Sh*t Happens!
The first aspect of the Hannafordopinion that deserves a closer look is
the court's supposition that the time and effort expended by the plaintiffs
was no more than the "typical annoyances and inconveniences that are a
part of everyday life." 52 Or, to put it in more colloquial terms, "sh*t
happens." Perhaps the court only meant to say that it has never shaped its
negligence and contract doctrines with the object of recognizing a standalone claim for lost time. But it would not necessarily be a mistake to read
the statement more broadly, and to suggest that there are two entirely
separate categories of harms: those of the "grin and bear it" variety for
which no legal recourse is available and those for which there is. However,
this observation gives no indication as to why the loss of time alone should
fall within the former category and not the latter. As part of everyday life,
we also encounter negligent automobile drivers who cause personal injury
or property damage and those who breach contracts, causing the aggrieved
party to lose value directly as a result of the breach. 3 Yet, no court would
tell the person lying in a hospital bed because of someone else's negligence
or the pizza restaurant owner who is forced out of business because his

Serv'g LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 706 (S.D. Ohio 2007). Of the latter variety is Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 406 Fed. Appx. 129 (9th Cir. 2010). Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' claim
that they were required to spend an inordinate amount of time monitoring their banking and
financial accounts, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the state law claims for negligence and
breach of contract based on Washington law. Ignoring the lost time component of the claim,
the court held that "mere danger of future harm" is not a cognizable injury. Id. at 131.
52. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 496
(Me. 2010). The district court reached the identical conclusion and expressed it in almost
identical language. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F.
Supp. 2d 108, 134 (D. Me. 2009) (stating that the plaintiffs' time and effort represented "the
ordinary frustrations and inconveniences that everyone confronts in daily life").
53. This is usually measured by the difference in value between what was promised
and what was received, see U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2012), or the additional expense of obtaining
a replacement, see U.C.C. § 2-712 (2012), or its value. U.C.C. § 2-713 (2012).
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pizza oven is delivered late that they have no recourse because "hey, that's
everyday life."
The Hannaford opinion lacks a convincing account of the criteria by
which claims for lost time should be compared to, and therefore
distinguished from, the vast array of compensable harms. After all, if our
goal is compensation,54 then the fact of wrongdoing rather than the form
that the resulting harm takes ought to be sufficient to empower plaintiffs to
prevail on the merits of their claims. However, this proposition assumes the
absence of practical or theoretical stumbling blocks to the recognition of a
particular form of harm. For example, many courts have denied recovery
for emotional distress because of the risk of fabricated or exaggerated
claims5 or because there is no market standard to measure its value.5 6 As
will be shown, these are not concerns that should caution against allowing
recovery for lost personal time.
Perhaps implicit in the Hannaford court's characterization of the lost
time claim as one of life's ordinary frustrations is the belief that plaintiffs
were not really harmed at all. If they were not harmed, they therefore
needed no protection from actions that were not harmful. Beyond the
clich6d "time is money" response to this position, there is both judicial and
legislative evidence to the contrary. As previously indicated and as
discussed infra, there is not a blanket prohibition against damages for lost
personal time in all cases. Thus, the court that refuses to value lost personal
time in one context would have to explain why it suddenly takes on value in
a different context.
In recent years, we have also witnessed a growing legislative awareness
that personal time has value. In September 2008, President George W. Bush
signed the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 ("the
Act").57 The Act applies to both online and offline information theft,
amending 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b) to require identity thieves convicted under
the Act to "pay an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent
by the victim in an attempt to remediate the intended or actual harm
incurred by the victim from the offense."5 8 Unfortunately, the Act is of little
help in a Hannaford-type case. The information thief has typically vanished
or is insolvent, so the victims' sole recourse is against the company to
whom they entrusted their information. With regard to such a claim, the Act
is silent.

54. See infranotes 172-76 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 n.3 (Minn.
1993).
56. See, e.g., Valentine v. Gen. Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628, 630, 631 (Mich.
1984).
57. Pub. L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat, 3560.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(6) (2011).
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Moreover, in considering the question of whether compensation for lost
personal time can be recovered for violation of statutes that do not
expressly speak to the matter, federal courts have shown a marked
willingness to answer in the affirmative. For example, in Hurry v. Jones,59
the First Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with this issue in the
context of a claim under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 (EAHCA).60 EAHCA provided "that a state receiving federal
assistance for education of the handicapped must assure a free appropriate
public education.",6 1 As well, EAHCA provided "that parties aggrieved by
decisions affecting a handicapped child's education may bring a civil action
in state or federal court" for "'such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.' ' 62 The parents of George Hurley, a physically and mentally
handicapped minor, sought damages from school and transportation
officials for the officials' failure to provide George with door-to-door
transportation to and from school.63 Among other items of damages, the
district court awarded the Hurleys $4,600.00 for the time they were forced
to spend driving George, an amount the court calculated on the basis of
$10.00 6per day for the daily round trips.64 The First Circuit affirmed the
award.6 The court held that recovery under EAHCA was not limited to outof-pocket expenses, but could also include compensation for the
expenditure of time and effort.66 Although the court recognized the risk of
overcompensation when reimbursing plaintiffs for the monetary equivalent
of time and effort, it thought the risk non-existent in this case because the
award was "obviously a bare-bones
figure, well within any reasonable
67
estimate of fair reimbursement.,
Another statutory case in which the lost time damages issue was
squarely presented to the court is Beaven v. United States Dept. of Justice.68
In Beaven, prison employees alleged that the defendants allowed an

59. 734 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1984).
60. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. This is the predecessor statute of what is now the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2011).
61. Hurry, 734 F.2d at 882.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 881.
64. Id.at 884.
65. Id. at 885.
66. Id.at 884.
67. Id.Similarly, in a case brought under what is now the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, the Third Circuit affirmed an award of $6,842.00 to the parent of a disabled
child for the time she had to spend in providing therapy to her daughter after the county
failed to provide that service. Bucks Cnty. Dep't of Mental Health/Mental Retardation v.
Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004). The amount of reimbursement was based on a rate
of $22 per hour, approximately half of what it would have cost the county to provide the
same treatment. Id.at 69-70.
68. 622 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2010).
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employee roster containing their sensitive personal information to be
disclosed to prison inmates and other prison staff.69 The plaintiffs sought to
recover lost time damages under the Privacy Act of 1974 (the "Act"). The
purpose of the Act is to address the handling of personal information by the
federal government and to provide a remedy when that information is
mishandled.71 One cannot, therefore, overstate the importance of the
damages provision, which reads as follows:
In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection g(1)(C) or (D) of
this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a
manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable
to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of - (A) actual damages
sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no
case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of
$1,000; and (B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the court.72
The language of this provision immediately raises at least one question:
What did Congress mean by the term "actual damages"? Was the definition
intended to be a narrow one that excludes recovery for nonpecuniary harms,
or is a more expansive understanding of the term appropriate? This question
has been litigated repeatedly and the circuits are split. 73 By contrast,
because persons whose personal information is compromised may suffer in
a myriad of ways that cannot be easily measured in terms of dollars and
cents, commentators are unanimous in their position that the efficacy of the
Act depends upon its application to nonpecuniary harms. If not, they argue,
the Act would be rendered "[t]oothless. ' '7

69. Id. at 544.
70. Id. See generally Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (current
version codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2011)).
71. See Privacy Act §§ 2(b)(1)-(6), 88 Stat. 896.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2011).
73. Compare Fanin v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 872 (11th Cir.
2009) (deciding that "[o]btaining monetary damages under § 552a(g)(4) requires proof of
'actual damages,' and in this circuit, that means pecuniary losses"), and Hudson v. Reno,
130 F.3d 1193, 1207 (6th Cir. 1997) (deciding that "actual damages under the Privacy Act
do not include recovery for 'mental injuries, loss of reputation, embarrassment or other nonquantifiable injuries'), and Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 328 (11th Cir. 1982) (deciding
that "damages under the Privacy Act are recoverable only for proven out-of-pocket losses"),
with Johnson v. Dep't of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 972 (5th Cir. 1983) (deciding that damages
for mental injuries can be recovered as "actual damages").
74. See Anne S. Kimbol, The Privacy Act May be Toothless, HEALTH LAW
PERSPECTIVES, (Sept. 2008), http://law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/homepage.asp.; Alex
Kardon, Damages Under the Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative
Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 705, 767 (2011) ("An interpretation of the term 'actual
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Returning to Beaven, the Sixth Circuit was able to dodge the plaintiffs'
request to reconsider its prior decision in Hudson v. Reno 5 by drawing a
sharp distinction between damages for lost time and those that would
compensate for some sort of mental harm. As the court put it:
Plaintiffs' "lost time" damages does not require us to decide whether
actual damages may include non-pecuniary losses-any Privacy Act injury
incurred in the form of lost time is necessarily a pecuniary harm that is
readily determined and does not require the
76 court to speculate in the same
manner as general or presumed damages.
The court then remanded the case to give plaintiffs the opportunity to
prove their
out-of-pocket losses to support their claim for lost time
77
damages.
The logical problem with labeling lost time as a pecuniary loss is that it
seems to depend crucially on the claim that a metric exists by which to
measure the loss. This is obviously the case in situations where the plaintiff
can show that because of the defendant's wrongful act she was deprived of
the opportunity to engage in an income generating activity. The Beaven
court made reference in its opinion to the plaintiffs' brief, in which they
chose their hourly wage rate as the appropriate factor by which to measure
their damages.7 8 The court chose not to explore the reason for this choice. If
it was because the plaintiffs had to take time off from work for which they
were not paid, then using their hourly wage in making the damages
calculation makes perfect sense; this is analogous to calculating lost profits
which can be recovered if proved with reasonable certainty.79 On the other
hand, if the plaintiffs are suggesting that their hourly wage should be used

damages' that excludes recovery for nonpecuniary harms . . . would in fact render the
Privacy Act toothless."). See also Daniel Solove, The Nature of Privacy Harms: Financial
and Physical Harm vs. Emotional and Mental Harm, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 15, 2010
8:01 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/01/the-nature-of-privacyharns-financial-and-physical-harm-vs-emotional-and-mental-harm.htm
(opining
that
excluding recovery for nonpecuniary harms would "mak[e] a total mockery of the Privacy
Act").
75. 130 F.3d 1193, 1207 (6th Cir. 1997). Recall that the Hudson court determined
"actual damages under the Privacy Act do not include recovery for mental injury, loss of
reputation, embarrassment, or other non-quantifiable injuries." Id.
76. Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 622 F.3d 558 n.13 (6th Cir. 2010).
77. Id. at 559-60.
78. Id. at 558.

79. See

DAN

B. DOBBs,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES

153-58 (West 1973).

This approach to valuation is also consistent with a distinction long recognized by courts and
is based on a division of time into work and leisure activities. Loss of the capacity to work is
considered an economic loss, whereas loss of the ability to enjoy leisure time is intangible
and not appraised as economic loss.
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to value the hours of leisure time that they were forced to sacrifice in order
to deal with the disclosure of their personal information, then their choice
seems to have been the result of intuition rather than reasoned analysis. An
explanation may be that the more litigants are left to their own devices in
their attempts to convert nonpecuniary losses into pecuniary losses capable
of being included in the elements of economic damages, the more they tend
to use simple linear calculation strategies such as multiplying the number of
hours lost by the amount of hourly earnings. Although this metric is
commonly associated with the valuation of leisure time, I ultimately reject
its use later in this Article in favor of an approach that would facilitate a
simpler and more consistent law of damages. 0 The only point emphasized
here is that when courts no longer feel shackled by common law restraints,
they have shown a willingness to recognize lost time as real harm that is
worthy of compensation.
Recent years have also seen pressures on courts to allow so-called
hedonic damages in wrongful death actions.8 ' The idea is that the value of a
person's life is more than the full economic loss measured by the present
value of the decedent's market earnings and non-market services; there are
also non-market losses that relate to the leisure activities and emotions that
make life worth living. One economist has explained the concept of hedonic
damages as follows:
It derives from the word pleasing or pleasure. I believe it is a Greek word.
It is distinct from the word economic. So it refers to the larger value of
life, the life at the pleasure of society, if you will, the life - the value
including economic, including moral, including philosophical, including
all the value with which ,,ou might hold life, is the meaning of the
expression "hedonic value. 2
Presumably, a policy of compensating tort victims for losses or of
deterring torts would not be fostered to the same degree as it would be if
compensation were not allowed for unconventional-albeit real-forms of
loss." If there are policy reasons to require wrongdoers to pay for hedonic
losses (the diminishment of the enjoyment of a person's life) when a life
ends, those same policy considerations would support damages for lost
personal time in non-death contexts. After all, if we accept the notion that

80. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Andrew Jay McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Casefor Hedonic
Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 57 (1990).
82. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (testimony of expert
witness).
83. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value ofLife: Has Voodoo Economics Come to the
Courts?, 1990 J. FORENSIC ECON. 1, 3 (arguing that loss of enjoyment of life damages has
what he calls "deterrence values"); see also infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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being unable to enjoy the totality of the minutes, hours and days that make
up a person's life is worthy of compensation, it would follow that if an
individual is prevented from enjoying leisure activities for some period of
time that is merely a component part of her life, that loss too should be
worthy of compensation.
Given that economic analysis supports the award of hedonic damages,
one may ask why they have not become commonplace in death cases. The
conceptual framework of survival statutes and of most wrongful death
statutes is relevant in answering this question. The problem that arises in
connection with hedonic damages in these actions is not that the loss of
non-market time (enjoyment of life) has no recognized value; it is that the
typical statute makes recovery an uphill battle.84
Survival statutes allow an individual's estate to recover damages that a
decedent, if still alive, could maintain a legal action to recover. 85 The
obvious difficulty is the fact that if, hypothetically, the decedent were still
alive, there would be no loss of life damages. Accordingly, the legal
action is treated as if it was a personal injury action from the injury to the
individual's death, but then becomes a wrongful death action thereafter.
The difficulty is that in a typical wrongful death action, it is the loss to the

84. See McClurg, supra note 81, at 90-91. Many of the problems that have plagued
plaintiffs seeking hedonic damages can be traced to the inherent difficulty of placing a dollar
value on the loss. Id. at 68-71 (discussing the speculative nature of hedonic damages). See
infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text (discussing some of the methods that have been
devised to measure hedonic damages).
85. See McClurg, supra note 81, at 91.
86. Andrew McClurg summed it up this way:
Hedonic damage claims do not fit within this statutory scheme because they are
predicated upon the death itself: the decedent's estate seeks damages for the harm
inflicted by death - the loss of life. Survival statutes merely authorize the damages
to which the decedent would have been entitled had he lived. Had he lived,
however, the decedent would have had no claim for lost life. Accordingly, lost-life
damages are unavailable under true survival statutes.
McClurg, supra note 81 at 91. Most jurisdictions do permit the recovery of lost enjoymentof-life damages in non-death cases. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic
Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, VAND. L. REv. 745, 748 (2007). The issue
there is whether these damages should be separately measured or are more properly
considered to be a component of a general award for pain and suffering. Compare, for
example, Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (an award for pain and
suffering necessarily includes damages for lost enjoyment of life), and Blodgett v. Olympic
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 646 P.2d 139, 145-46 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (same), with Thompson v.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980) (damages for pain and
suffering and damages for lost enjoyment of life are not duplicative), and Mariner v.
Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980) (same).
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survivors that counts, not the loss to the decedent. The value of lost time
to the decedent thus becomes relevant only to the extent that it leads to
losses by the relevant survivors.88
Although the foregoing statutory obstacles have deterred courts from
permitting hedonic damages in state law death cases, when other statutes
are called into play, judicial reception to these damages has been quite
different. 89 For example, federal courts have been sensitive to the benefits
attending hedonic damages in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.90 The challenge these courts face, however, is to discover a basis for
ignoring state law restrictions on loss of life damages in wrongful death
cases. 91 The key analytical step to accomplishing this is to establish that a
state law restriction on such recovery is "inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States. 92 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue, it has received the attention of several lower federal
courts.93 For example, when faced with a Wisconsin statutory scheme that
did not allow damages for loss of life, the Seventh Circuit succinctly
declared:

87.
88.

See McClurg, supra note 81 at 93.
See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 81 at 93. The author explains:

The wrongful death action is for the benefit of the statutorily designated survivors.
The object is to compensate survivors for the losses they suffer because of the
death of a loved one. The damages that are available - lost pecuniary contributions
of the decedent supplemented in most states by damages for loss of society and/or
mental anguish - correspond with this purpose.
89. Id. In fact, Congress on occasion has seen fit to expressly authorize the award of
hedonic damages within the statute itself. Such is the case for example with the law creating
the September 11 fund. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101.
90. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 81, at 80 (observing that "[b]y far, the warmest
reception for lost life damages has been in federal courts entertaining actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983").
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 "directs courts to apply state law where the federal civil rights
statutes are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies." id at 81.
There is little doubt that section 1983 is deficient as to damages issues. Id. at 81 ("Section
1983, consisting of only a single operative sentence, is deficient as to many issues of
substantive law, including damages issues.").
92. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
93. The United States Supreme Court has, however, held that loss of enjoyment of life
damages can be recovered in personal injury cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. In Molzoff v. UnitedStates, 502 U.S. 301 (1992), the Supreme Court disagreed with the
definition of prohibited punitive damages under the FTCA as any damages that go beyond
compensating for actual pecuniary loss. This ruling is a clear indication of the Court's
willingness to expand victim's rights to include nonpecuniary damages.

774
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In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01 and 895.04, along with
Wisconsin decisions construing those provisions, which would preclude
recovery to [decedent's] estate for loss of life, are inconsistent with the
deterrent policy of Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of life. The Wisconsin law therefore cannot be applied to
preclude
the $100,000 damages recovered by [decedent's] estate for loss
94
of life.
In light of this statement, the court's approach might be understood as
clear recognition of legislative intent on the question of deterrence. Of
course the notion of deterrence should not be taken as a mechanical
application of some actual legislative decision; Congress has rendered no
general decision about what remedies are needed to effectuate the policies
behind § 1983. 9' In the absence of a clear statement, however, allowing the
estate of victims killed in violation of their constitutional rights to recover
for loss of life would be consistent with Congress's concern for protecting
life and might improve the operation of the civil rights statute.
Thus far I have focused on legislative and corresponding judicial
developments that give recognition to the normative view that the forced
inability to pursue leisure or recreation (i.e., the inability to use one's time
as one wishes) should be treated as a separate category of noneconomic
damages that can be recovered by an aggrieved party. This poses a forceful
challenge to the Hannafordcourt's conception of the plaintiffs' lost time in
this context as "typical annoyances or inconveniences that are part of
everyday life."9 6 As a result, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and other
courts not only fail to recognize this crucial aspect of damages, but cannot
provide a critical framework for distinguishing recoverable from
nonrecoverable noneconomic damages in particular contexts. Yet, because
recoveries for noneconomic damages for lost leisure time are needed to
fully compensate aggrieved parties and deter wrongful conduct, their
preclusion also undermines the claim that economic theory has much to say
about the rationality of damage awards.97

94. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Linzie v.
City of Columbia, 651 F. Supp. 740, 742 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that recovery for loss of
life is consistent with Section 1983's deterrent policy); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp.
1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that recovery for loss of life is permitted, but future earnings
of decedent should not be factored into recovery for loss of life).
95. See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239-40 (observing that "the fundamental policies behind
Section 1983 are twofold: compensation for and deterrence of unconstitutional acts
committed under state law").
96. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Security Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 108, 134
(N.D. Me. 2009).
97. See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
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B. UnprincipledClassification

As previously discussed, the Hannaford court uses a classification
discourse that treats damages differently, depending on whether the
underlying substantive claim involves an intentional tort, the negligent
damage or destruction of personal property or personal injury, or a breach
of contract. 98 Given this mode of analysis, it is now relevant to inquire
whether a cause of action approach to the damage rules applicable to the
loss of personal time is conceptually valid. Notwithstanding the lack of
explanation by the court, the Hannaford court's opinion is arguably
consistent with traditional doctrine and the dictates of precedent. 99 As I
explain below, however, equity and social utility suggest that there are no
persuasive grounds for treating the different categories of claims
differently.
As a starting point, it is worth noting that to suggest that doctrinal
categories are sensible tools for rationalizing outcomes may not attract
much argument. 0 0 Such an approach to decision-making is in many cases
reasonable, or even efficient. Presumably, those who are called upon to
interpret and apply the law (namely, judges) are more likely to reach
predictable results when they need only situate their decisions within an
existing categorical framework.0 l As Roscoe Pound explained:
Classification is a shaping and developing of traditional systematic
conceptions and traditional systematic categories in order to organize the
body of legal precepts so that they may be: (1) Stated effectively with a
minimum of repetition, overlapping, and potential conflict, (2)
administered effectively, (3) taught effectively, and (4) developed
effectively for new situations. 102
However, the costs of a system in which case outcomes are
predetermined by whichever category the court feels is applicable may
sometimes cause us to think twice about the utility of our basic structures of
doctrinal classification. As is sometimes the case, the relevant category may

98. See supra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudenceof Classification,41 STAN. L. REV.
661, 664 (1989) (noting that "[c]lassification in law is an important and ubiquitous aspect of
legal reasoning"); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356
(2006) (noting that "[judicial] interpretation should be conservative in the literal sense respecting settled judicial doctrine but also deferring to traditions").
101. See Feinman, supra note 100, at 676 ("Consistency in particular entails the internal
consistency of treating like cases alike and different cases differently, and the external
consistency of justifying results according to some general, positive, public principle.
Classification helps maintain the order and validity of the legal process.").
102. Roscoe Pound, Classificationof Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944 (1924).
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be unclear or a particular fact pattem may not quite fit within an existing
category. 103 As a result, there may be increased instances where judges are
less than forthright when presenting the legal justification for their
opinions.' Moreover, a legal system built around categories with separate
and distinct rules may lead to a certain amount of rigidity, which makes the
system less flexible and able to adapt to a changing society. 105 Finally, a
serious problem of consistency may result from the overlap between two or
more substantive doctrines.
Although the foregoing classification issues are general and can arise in
all fields of law, they have been of particular concern to contract and tort
scholars. Several insights can be drawn from the much-litigated "economic
loss rule." This rule has potential application to two broad categories of
cases: (1) cases where the plaintiff has a contractual relationship with the
seller of a defective product, and (2) cases where
the plaintiff brings a
10 6
negligence action against a contractual stranger.
Regarding the first category, the law has evolved to provide purchasers
of goods, and sometimes third parties, with two possible regimes under
which they may seek recovery: tort law and contract law. Although tort law
makes available actions due to negligence, the most significant tort theory
open to plaintiffs is strict liability. 0 7 In contract, the competing theory of

103. A useful example of this idea is provided by Professor James Rogers in his
discussion of restitution and unjust enrichment. See James Steven Rogers, Restitution for
Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 55, 84 (2007). Rogers notes that as long as restitution is viewed as a
parasitic doctrine (i.e., permitting recovery only when the conduct in question is
characterized as wrongful by other law), courts will have an incentive to manipulate other
law if existing legal categories of wrongful behavior do not quite fit. Id. He contends, for
example, that courts often find abuses of fiduciary relationships by defendants, even though
such findings are hardly supported by applicable law. Id. For further discussion of the
judicial practice of strained characterization, see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296, 328 (1990)
(suggesting that "if judges more accurately revealed the forces that move them to decide,
lawyers and commentators would be able more directly to address judges' real concerns").
One possible consequence of a legal system where outcomes turn on the uncertain
categorization of fact patterns is the opportunities it affords judges to engage in covert
policymaking: a world with many categories provides judges with many choices. Id.
Concern that there are costs associated with judicial opinions in which the underlying
reasoning is inaccurately stated or deliberately obscured is a persistent theme in the literature
on judicial candor. Id.
105. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 542 (1988) (pointing
out that "[r]ules stabilize by inflating the importance of the classifications of yesterday,"
leading to "inflexibility in the face of a changing future").
106. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Am. Aviation, 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004).
107. A cause of action for negligence generally requires plaintiffs to establish that the
manufacturer or seller has failed to use reasonable care to eliminate foreseeable dangers that
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significance is the implied warranty of merchantability. 10 8 The economic
loss rule seeks to carve out a separate niche for tort and warranty based on
the type of damages involved.' The rule's basic proposition is that when
the purchaser of a product sustains economic loss without personal injury or
damage to property, the purchaser must seek a remedy in contract, not in
tort.'
The ostensibly straightforward nature of the economic loss rule in this
context is belied by the confusion and conflicting case law it has spawned.
Even the basic question of whether damages for injury to the property itself
can be recovered in tort has yielded inconsistent answers."' The poles are
represented by the majority-or California-position (i.e., where a
defective product causes only monetary damages, warranty liability

create an unreasonable risk of harm to the person or property of another. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965). In the case of manufacturing defects and defendants that
are not manufacturers, this may be impossible to do. Whereas negligence focuses on the
actions of the defendant, a strict liability claim focuses on the product. Thus, it is not
surprising that plaintiffs exhibit a preference for the latter theory, which is currently
enshrined in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Section 1 provides that
"[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused
by the defect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998). Section 2
then proceeds to set forth three separate standards for determining whether a product is
defective, depending on whether the claimed defect is (1) a manufacturing defect, (2) a
design defect, or (3) a failure to warn or give adequate instructions. Id. at § 1. For further
discussion of the concept of defect, see infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
108. UCC Article 2 recognizes several "gap-filling" warranties that are part of the
contract of the parties unless they are excluded or modified by agreement. Section 2-314
provides that if the seller is "a merchant with respect to goods of that kind," then "a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale." U.C.C. § 2314(1) (2011). Determining the level of section 2-314 quality that is required by the term
"merchantable" obviously calls for a fact-intensive inquiry guided by the criteria of section
2-314(2)(a)-(f). See id. at § 2-314(2)(a)-(f. The usual focus in a products liability case is
whether the goods were "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Id. at
§ 2-314(2)(c). Because the warranty of merchantability is imposed on parties by law based
on public policy, it looks strikingly similar to the tort doctrine of strict liability- hence,
Prosser's colorful observation that implied warranty is "a freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract." William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960). In addition to the implied
warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff may sometimes be able to claim a breach of an
express warranty under section 2-313 or the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
under section 2-315. Since these two warranties are not designed to address the basic safety
of goods, they will be ignored in the discussion that follows.
109. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Am. Aviation, 891 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 2004).
110. Id.
111. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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preempts the field)" 2 and the minority-or New Jersey-position (i.e.,
allowing tort recovery for injury to the product itself whether or not the
defect created an unreasonable risk of harm). 1 3 In between these two poles
are intermediate positions, seeking to differentiate between, for example,
"the disappointed users ... and the endangered ones,"' "1 4 or between "the
nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury
arose."",15

With two different avenues of relief potentially available to plaintiffs
(tort and contract), uncertainty, unpredictability, and confusion often result
when the two regimes compete. 16 Maintaining the crucial distinction
between the categories of tort and contract and the significance of applying
one or the other necessitates that there be rule differences between the two
regimes. And there are. For example, the measurement of damages may
different, with only tort law permitting recovery of damages for pain and
suffering and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages. In addition, under the
contract regime only, the implied warranty of merchantability can be freely
disclaimed' 7 and remedies limited by including appropriate terms in the
agreement of the parties." 8 Another difference exists in the applicability of

112. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150-51 (Cal. 1965).
113. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 308-10 (N.J. 1965).
114. See, e.g., Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978).
115. See, e.g., Pa. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d
Cir. 1981).
116. This is not an original observation. See, e.g., Sundberg v. Keller Ladder, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 671, 676 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("Although the separate action of 'implied warranty'
had long co-existed with more formal product liability tort actions, it became duplicative and
confusing."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (1998) ("To
allow two or more factually identical risk-utility claims to go to a jury under different labels,
whether 'strict liability,' 'negligence,' or 'implied warranty of merchantability,' would
generate confusion and may well result in inconsistent verdicts."); James J. White,
EvaluatingArticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A PreliminaryEmpiricalExpedition,
75 MICH. L. REv. 1262, 1270 (1977) ("[D]rafters . . . did not foresee the considerable
potential for confusion between the Code provisions and such strict tort doctrines.").
117. SeeU.C.C. §2-316(2011).
118. It is not unusual for the contract to contain a clause that excludes recovery for
consequential damages. See id. at § 2-719(3). Moreover, the buyer may agree to an exclusive
remedy such as "repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts," which would
effectively preclude the recovery of damages. Id. at § 2-719(1)(a). The approach of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is quite different:
Disclaimers and limitation of remedies by product sellers or other distributors,
waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral or
written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against
sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §

18 (1998).
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statutes of limitation: the warranty statute in contract begins to run at the
time the goods are tendered, while in tort, the statute typically begins to run
at the time of injury. Yet another difference is that, unlike breach of
19
warranty actions in contract, tort actions require no privity of contract.
Finally, notice of breach is a prerequisite to recovery in an action for breach
of warranty, while no such notice is required to recover in tort. " °
The foregoing differences between warranty claims and tort claims in
many ways are justified as a reflection of the different policies that underlie
the two categories. Contract law seeks to protect the economic expectations
of the parties that haveas their source the private allocation of risks and
costs that arise from their agreement. In contrast, tort law is designed to
accomplish a collective allocation of loss through the imposition of duties
that arise from society's interest in the avoidance of harm, irrespective of
the existence of a contract. The distinction between tort and contract
therefore rests on the importance of the latter in promoting public safety
and the12 1need for the former to protect the expectations of contracting
parties.
At least as a general rule, these policy differences argue powerfully in
favor of maintaining, at least to some extent, the two products liability
regimes that currently exist. To be sure, one could argue that burdening a
product liability case with the conceptual baggage of discrete liability
regimes when the claim rests on the same factual predicate adds nothing but
confusion and, therefore, consolidation of the two doctrinal categories of
liability in and of itself would improve the current system. 122 Without
entering entirely into the fray about the strengths and weaknesses of
complete consolidation, I wish to suggest that although tort theories of
products liability and the implied warranty of merchantability coexist, the

119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998)
("Strict liability in tort for defectively manufactured products merges the concept of implied
warranty, in which negligence is not required, with the tort concept of negligence, in which
contractual privity is not required."). UCC Article 2 does contain a provision that extends a
warranty made directly to a class of third parties not in privity with the warrantor. See
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2011).
120. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (2011).
121. See, e.g., Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J.
1985) ("The purpose of a tort duty of care is to protect society's interest in freedom from
harm, i.e., the duty arises from policy considerations formed without reference to any
agreement between the parties. A contractual duty, by comparison, arises from society's
interest in the performance of promises."); see also E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986) ("[Tlhe failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of
its bargain [is] traditionally the core concern of contract law.").
122. Some courts have merged the doctrines of tort and contract liability because they
are so intertwined. See, e.g., Hearn v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1103 (D. Ariz. 2003) ("[I]n Arizona, when a complaint alleges product liability claims under
theories of both breach of implied warranties and strict liability, those theories merge.").
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coherence of each category does not necessarily require a different
approach to every issue.123
The point can be made more vivid by examining the distinction
between the defect concepts in tort law and those in implied warranty
theory. In a personal injury or property damage case, whether the claim is
based on negligence, breach of implied warranty, or strict liability, the
product must be found to be unsafe (i.e., dangerous by some measure) to be
actionable. There is simply no good reason why the relevant standard for
determining whether a product is unsafe should not be the same under all
three categories. Not surprisingly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability espouses this position, 124 and the drafting 1committee
that
25
agreed.
2
Article
U.C.C.
amended
defunct
now
the
produced

123. At least one court has ignored the characterization of a plaintiff's claim when
deciding the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 465
N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ohio 1984) ("[I]n determining which limitation period will apply, courts
must look to the actual nature or subject matter of the case, rather than to the form in which
the action is pleaded.").
124. A comment to section 2 of the Restatement states:
Warranty. Liability for harm caused by product defects imposed by the rules stated
in this chapter is tort liability, not liability for breach of warranty under the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Courts may characterize claims under this
Chapter as claims for breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability. But in
cases involving defect-caused harm to persons or property, a well-coordinated
body of law dealing with liability for such harm arising out of the sale of defective
products would adopt the tort definition of product defect.
§ 2 cmt. r (1998).
125. See Amended U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (2003). Amended Article 2 received final
approval at both the 2002 annual meeting of the Uniform Law Commission and the 2003
annual meeting of the American Law Institute. Currently, there have been no state adoptions
and the sponsoring organizations withdrew their support in 2011.
Case law on the approach to the question of whether proof that a product is
"defective" under strict liability in tort will establish that a product is not merchantable, and
vice versa has been mixed. Perhaps the leading case denying such congruency is Denny v.
FordMotor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995). In that case, the New York Court of Appeals
opined that the question of design defect for purposes of strict liability is to be determined by
application of a risk-utility balancing test that requires evaluation of a number of "policydriven factors," whereas the question of merchantability is to be decided according to
whether the product satisfies ordinary consumer expectations. Id. at 735-36. For a contrary
view, see Chestnut v. FordMotor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968 (4th Cir. 1971) ("The standard of
safety of goods imposed on the seller or manufacturer of a product is essentially the same
whether the theory of liability is labeled warranty or negligence or strict tort liability: the
product must not be unreasonably dangerous at the time that it leaves the defendant's
possession ... ").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
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Even if the considerations marshaled thus far show that overlap
between tort and contract law may be desirable in some situations, and that
barriers between the two categories need to be adjusted when it comes to
establishing that a product defect exists, it does not follow that these two
legal categories must also produce the same damages award. Countervailing
considerations, some of them taken up below, make it easy to understand
the continuing debate over the wisdom of maintaining remedial distinctions
applicable in the two different substantive areas. But even if it can be
shown that distinctions are appropriate in some contexts, I attempt to show
that the basic arguments against a unified theory of damages are not
decisive, and that a principle of congruence would improve the operation
of
26
our legal system by making damages awards more fair and efficient.
To put this observation in context, consider, first, the economic loss
doctrine and its rationale in situations where a contract is lacking.1 27 What
explains the reluctance of tort law to provide redress when the interest that
has been interfered with is of a purely economic nature unconnected with
damage to the plaintiffs person or property? The rule's basic utility that it
operates as an administratively manageable control mechanism for dealing
with the problems caused by the inordinate liability that might otherwise
result if economic loss were permitted, especially in cases involving large
scale disasters. In this regard, the warning of Fifth Circuit Judges Clark and
Gee in an economic loss case arising out of a collision between two ships in
the Mississippi River Gulf outlet is particularly pertinent:
An oil spill damages hundreds, perhaps thousands, of miles of coastal
area. A cloud of noxious industrial gas leaks out, kills thousands, and
injures thousands more. A commonly-used building material is
discovered, years after the fact, to possess unforeseen lethal qualities
affecting thousands who have worked with it .

. .

. [T]he dispute-

resolution systems of courts are poorly equipped to manage disasters of
such magnitude and ... we should be wary of adopting rules of decision

126. This view has been expressed by others in other contexts. See, e.g., Paul T.
Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal
Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 99 (1986) ("One set of facts can lead to three, four, or
maybe even five separate claims. But, as such multiple theories reach the courts with greater
frequency, the courts themselves will soon realize that some consistent theory must evolve to
govern damages awards. A fair system of law, these courts will acknowledge, must produce
the same damages awards for relying promisees regardless of whether those promisees sue
asserting contract, agency, tort, insurance, or restitution theories. Consistency must be
achieved.").
127. In those situations where there is no contract, the rule cannot be defended on the
ground that economic losses are generally best allocated via contract. The force of this
defense is particularly evident when the contract disclaims the warranty of merchantability
or limits remedies for breach. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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which, as would that contended for28by the dissent, encourage the drawing
of their broader aspects before us.'

But if this is the modem rationale for the rule, it is apparent that
considerable thought ought to be given to restructuring it. Resting the
tortfeasor's liability for economic loss on whether there was corresponding
personal injury or property damage seems undesirable because (1) it lets an
all-or-nothing damages decision ride on a factor that is not finely geared to
preventing excessive liability for accidental injuries, (2) it is an unnecessary
constraint on liability in light of other existing tort doctrines, and (3) it can
lead to outcomes
that are logically inconsistent with the remedial goals of
29
tort law.
Professor Silverstein illustrates the first objection with the following
hypothetical:
[I]f negligent maintenance of a utility transformer causes a telephone pole
to lop the chimney from a factory's roof, the utility must bear the costs of
repair; if the falling telephone pole separates a person's little finger from
her left hand, the utility is liable for her medical expenses, pain and
suffering, and lost income. Indeed, if the lopped off chimney costs the
factory a few days of production, or if the separated finger causally
disables an investor from effecting a FAX transmission authorizing a sale

128. State of Louisiana v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir. 1985) (Clark,
C.J. and Gee, J., concurring); see also Barber Lines A/S v. MV Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50,
55 (1st Cir. 1985) (then-Judge Breyer expressed concern that "liability for pure financial
harm, insofar as it proved vast, cumulative and inherently unknowable in amount, could
create incentives that are perverse."). In a case involving an investor's claim against an
accounting firm for negligently certifying a balance sheet, Justice Cardozo had a similar
reaction to the threat of widespread liability:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes to these consequences.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
129. The economic loss doctrine is not without its fair share of critics. See, e.g., Eileen
Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403,
438 (1999) (arguing that "the categorical denial of the right to recover for pure economic
injury does positive injustice to our understanding of the significance of material insecurity
and economic integrity in American society"); see also Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on
Liabilityfor Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L.
REv. 43, 46-47 (1972) (arguing that a logical inconsistency exists between the rules
governing economic recovery under personal injury and non-physical injury).
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of stock worth $2 million, both losses are recoverable because they are

attendant on negligently inflicted damage to person (the broken finger) or
property (the damaged chimney). But if, instead of amputating a finger or
a chimney, the downed telephone pole merely causes the interruption of a
communication authorizing the stock transaction, the investor, not the
utility company, must bear the $2 million loss; and if the damaged
chimney causes the factory to suspend operations for a few days, while the
utility is responsible to the factory owner for repairs and lost profits, it is
not responsible to the factory employees for lost wages, since the
employees experienced no physical impairment of their property or
persons.

30

It should be obvious that the economic loss rule's achievement of the
advantages of controlling the dimensions of the problems that could arise
from large-scale disasters is, at best, fortuitous. If the telephone pole falls to
the left and causes even a small amount of damage to the factory building,
the barrier to economic loss recovery is lifted, regardless of its amount. If,
however, the pole falls to the right and leaves the building unscathed, the
negligently inflicted losses must be born in full by the owners. If the fear is
of imposing a "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class,"' 13 why should the courts look exclusively to
whether a plaintiff was injured in a particular way, but not attend to the
magnitude of the loss? On this latter dimension-obviously critical to the
accepted rationale for the historical reluctance to award damages for pure
financial harm-the economic loss rule has nothing to say. If the rule were
truly finely geared to respond to the law's concern with indeterminate
liability, it would place its emphasis on
the magnitude of damages involved,
132
not the form that those damages take.
Of course, the rule may be defended on purely administrative
convenience grounds. Even if it is a poor reflection of the law's overriding
concern for avoiding unlimited liability for negligently engaging in a
socially desirable activity, it does operate as a bright-line rule that can be
administered with little difficulty, and does to some extent avoid the flood
of litigation that would likely ensue if the rule were abandoned.' 33 Indeed,

130. Silverstein, supra note 129, at 404.
131. UltramaresCorp., 174N.E. at444.
132. Another illogical aspect of the economic loss rule is its refusal to recognize
property damage as just another form of economic loss. See Silverstein, supra note 129, at
434 (recognizing that "damage to property is often nothing more (or less) than economic
loss"). Professor Silverstein also questions the coherency of permitting recovery for pain and
suffering but not pure economic loss. As she puts it, "[i]t is ironic, of course, that conditions
not measurable in money are allowable damages while consequences like economic loss,
measurable only in money, may be deemed immune from recovery." Id. at 436 n. 163.
133. As one commentator has noted, "only a limited amount of physical damage can
ever ensue from a single act, while the number of economic interests a tortfeasor may
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the majority in M/V Testbank, while conceding that there is often a certain
arbitrariness of result, nevertheless praises the rule's administrative
simplicity: "[W]hen lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional
edges to be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the
inevitable [result] ....
But is the majority correct? Is application of the
rule as simple as it assumes? As criticism of the rule has grown, some
courts have complicated matters by recognizing numerous exceptions to its
application. 131
The difficulties inherent in the economic loss rule are well illustrated in
36
the Eastern District of Virginia case of Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp.'
There the defendant manufactured and eventually dumped thousands of
pounds of Kepone, a highly toxic pesticide, into the Hopewell, Virginia
sewerage treatment plant.37 When this dumping activity was discovered,
the State of Virginia ordered portions of the James River and the
Chesapeake Bay closed to fishing.38 Pruitt was one of several legal actions
that were commenced as a result of these events. The plaintiffs fell into
three different groups: (1) commercial fishermen, shellfishermen, and
oysterbed lessors;139 (2) wholesale and retail seafood enterprises not
themselves engaged in fishing operations, including restaurants; 40 and (3)
operators of marinas and owners of boats and owners of tackle and bait
shops. 4' In addition to pressing their own claims, this latter group was42also
permitted to act as surrogates for the claims of recreational fishermen.1
The complexity of the legal issues involved is best revealed in Judge
Merhige's analysis of the rights of the commercial fisherman to recover for
all lost profits caused by a decline in demand for what the public believed
might be tainted seafood. 43 The plaintiffs had to overcome both the

destroy in a brief moment of carelessness is practically limitless." Comment, Foreseeability
of Third-Party Economic Injuries - A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 283, 298
(1953). This may be true, but I question whether the economic loss rule is best suited to
serve the particular function of limiting claims. See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying
text.
134. State of Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985).
135. For many of exceptions to the rule, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 707-10 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
136. Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
137. Andrew W. McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A Return to Principlesof Corrective
Justice in Deciding Economic Loss Cases, 69 VA. L. REv. 1517, 1518 (1983).
138. Id. at 1518 n.5.
139. See Pruitt,523 F. Supp. at 976.
140. See id. at 979 n.20.
141. See id. at 980 n.23.
142. Id. at 980.
143. Because the only point I am trying to make here is that those who insist that the
economic loss rule is a rule of administrative simplicity leading to predictable results are
oversimplifying the rule's application, I will ignore the other aspects of the case. For the best
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Restatement and traditional precedent-based arguments that would deny
recovery in cases of this kind. 144 In addition to case law from other
jurisdictions that would require plaintiffs to show an injury to a property
interest in the fish or fishing grounds, they had to contend with the decision
of the Fourth Circuit in Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers,Inc. v. Lone
Star Industries,Inc. , a' a case brought by commercial parties to recover for
business losses resulting from the closure of the James River to marine
traffic after the defendants' vessel struck a bridge. 46 In that case, the Fourth
Circuit held that because plaintiffs could not show damage to their property
or person, they could not recover. 47 In concluding that the economic loss
rule barred recovery, the Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Union Oil Company v. Oppen.148 In that case, the Oppen court
allowed the claims of commercial fishermen damaged by an oil spill on the
purely pragmatic ground that it would help foster environmental protection
policies. 149 The Marine Navigation court rejected the Oppen oil pollution
exception as applying to its own factual situation.' 50 In other words, it had
no application to claims for economic losses not deriving from harm to
marine life caused by an event that implicates environmental concerns.' 5'
Within the framework of the foregoing distinction between Marine
Navigation and Oppen, Judge Merhige could have justified recovery for the
fisherman by concluding that the case before him was factually more
closely aligned with the latter than the former. The acceptability of this
justification in turn rests on accepting the irrelevance of the distinction that
in Oppen, fish died; whereas in Pruitt, the fish survived, but demand
declined. s2 Indeed, it was this distinction that the defendant relied upon to
support its contention that the plaintiffs' claims should fail. 53 Judge
Merhige did not directly assess the strength of these competing arguments,
instead concluding that Allied's concession that the fisherman would be
entitled to recover lost profits for actual destruction of the fishery was

and most comprehensive discussion of Pruitt,see McThenia & Ulrich, supra note 137.

144. See Pruitt,523 F. Supp. at 977;

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 766C (1979).

145. Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers, Inc. v. Lone Star Indus., 638 F.2d 700 (4th
Cir. 1981).
146. Id. at 701; McThenia & Ulrich, supra note 137, at 1525.
147. Id. at 702.
148. See id. at 701; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
149. See Oppen, 501 F.2d at 570.
150. See Marine Navigation, 638 F.2d at 701.
151. Seeid. at 701-02.
152. The fishermen were able to catch their quota of fish, but their customers refused to
pay normal prices for what they considered to be tainted seafood. See McThenia & Ulrich,
supra note 137, at 1527 n.51 (citing Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 5-6, Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Civ. A.
No. 77-0035-R)).
153. Id.
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tantamount to a showing of a property right or interest in the fish. 5 4 While
the decision was a clear win for the commercial fishermen, there is
obviously some difficulty in finding legal support for this bit of alchemy. It
is hard to accept the proposition that those whose business it is to fish have
any type of property interest in fish that have not yet been caught. One can
surmise that although Judge Merhige was attracted by the perceived
benefits of the economic loss rule, he nevertheless sought an approach that
would allow the fisherman to recover. As his opinion demonstrates, he
found such an approach. Recovery was permitted and, at the same time,
Judge Merhige was able to insist that the law only protects a plaintiff whose
person or property is physically injured.
It is a central dogma of the economic loss rule that its rationale can be
adequately explained as a simple way of controlling the possible flood of
litigation which might otherwise ensue from large scale disasters. My point
above is that the rule's application is not necessarily simple. The question
now is whether it is necessary. To suggest an answer to this question
prompts reflection on some general features of tort law.
The classic case of Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo provides a
convenient vehicle for examining several of the doctrinal devices that have
served to limit liability.' 55 The unfortunate chain of events in this case
began when the defendants allegedly caused a vessel to break loose from
her moorings. 56 The vessel then careened down the Buffalo River and
157
struck a second vessel which in turn broke loose from her moorings.
Together, both vessels drifted further downstream, eventually crashing into
and collapsing the Michigan Avenue Bridge. 58 The two vessels, together
with the wreckage from the bridge, formed a dam which caused extensive
flooding and an ice jam.' 59 As a result of this disaster, one plaintiff, the
owner of cargo stored on a vessel berthed below the Michigan Avenue
Bridge, sought to recover damages resulting from its inability to unload the
cargo directly into its grain elevators located above the collapsed bridge. 6
A second plaintiff had a somewhat different claim. At the time these events
transpired it was engaged in unloading cargo from a vessel above the
bridge. Apparently, this vessel was struck by one of the two vessels floating
down the river, causing it to break loose from the dock to which it was
moored and get stuck in the ice jam. The upshot of all this 61
was that special
equipment had to be rented to continue with the unloading.1

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Pruitt,523 F. Supp. at 978.
Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
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The court's opinion here contained a concise exposition of why
liability-limiting devices are needed: "Such limiting principles must exist in
any system of jurisprudence for cause and effect succeed one another with
the same certainty that night follows day and the consequences of the
simplest act may be traced over an ever-widening canvas with the passage
of time.' 62
Courts faced with the problem of catastrophic liability often make use
of one or more flexible concepts-proximate cause, 163 duty 64 and
foreseeability 165-that can be used to draw the line between whether or not
legal responsibility exists for the harm that has in fact occurred to the
plaintiff's interests. In Kinsman, the court proceeded on the assumption that
the defendants could reasonably foresee the consequences that would
follow from their negligence. 166 Thus, if the court were to hold that the
defendants were not accountable, that assumption would require it to make
an instrumental shift in orientation. If the tort concepts that limit liability
are conveniently put aside, the legal responsibility question can be
approached on explicit policy grounds. Indeed, the court opined that .' [i]t is
all a question of expediency ...of fair judgment, always keeping in mind
the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical
and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind."",167 The court
ultimately denied recovery on the ground that "the connection between the
defendants' negligence and the claimants' damages [was] too tenuous and
remote.
,,168

162. Id. at 824.
163. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, at 273 ("The term 'proximate cause' is applied
by the courts to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where
the fact of causation is clearly established.").
164. Id. at 274 ("It is quite possible to state every question which arises in connection
with 'proximate cause' in the form of a single question: was the defendant under a duty to
protect the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur? Such a form of statement does
not, of course, provide any answer to the question, or solve anything what ever ....
").
165. Id. at 280-81 ("At the risk of becoming wearisome, it must be repeated that the
question [of foreseeability] is primarily not one of causation, and never arises until causation
has been established. It is rather one of the fundamental policy of the law, as to whether the
defendant's responsibility should extend to such results.").
166. See Kinsman, 388 F.2d at 824.
167. Id.at 825 (quoting Judge Andrews' statement in Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248
N.Y. 339, 354-55 (N.Y. 1928)).
168. Id. To further explain its conclusion, the court offered the following illustration:
To anyone familiar with N.Y. traffic there can be no doubt that a foreseeable result
of an accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush hour is that thousands
of people will be delayed. A driver who negligently caused such an accident would
certainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the crash. But we doubt
that damages would be recoverable against the negligent driver in favor of truckers
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The conclusions of proximate cause, duty, and foreseeability are,
therefore, perhaps best understood as a covert policy judgment on the issue
of liability, based upon the fear of exposing the defendant to unknowable,
catastrophic liability. But as Professor Karl Llewellyn so famously put it:
"Covert tools are never reliable tools."' 169 One justification for the economic
loss rule may be that it minimizes costs by providing courts with a less
problematic alternative for protecting against unreasonable risk.
Nevertheless, support for the economic loss rule based solely on the
indeterminacy of the various tort concepts misses the more salient point that
the rule serves as an absolute bar to recovery, even in those instances where
policy considerations might otherwise lead us to conclude that the
defendant should be legally responsible. In other words, why should we
maintain a rule that consistently benefits wrongdoers at the expense of
those who are victimized by the consequences of the wrongdoer's
actions? 170 The emphasis should rest on the extent to which the imposition
of liability is consistent with the instrumentalist and other goals of tort law,
notwithstanding the fact that this sort of analysis cannot be applied with
mathematical precision.17 The familiar tort concepts that currently serve to

or contract carriers who suffered provable losses because of the delay or to the
wage earner who was forced to "clock in" an hour late. And yet it was surely
foreseeable that among the many who would be delayed would be truckers and
wage earners.
Id.at 825 n.8.
169. K.N. Llewellyn, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939) (book review). Llewellyn
wrote this in connection with his discussion of the willingness of courts to perceive the
unfairness of a particular clause or contract and attempt to rectify it through misconstruction
of contract language or misapplication of particular doctrines. Evidence suggests that section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("Unconscionable Contract or Term") emerged
from Llewellyn's own calculus of the costs and benefits associated with what he perceived
to be the less than forthright manner in which courts reacted against harsh contractual
provisions. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code: The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 525-27 (1967).
170. This point was made in a dissenting opinion from Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1052 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (stating "absent hard
data, I would rather err on the side of receiving little additional benefit from imposing
additional quanta of liability than err by adhering to Robins' inequitable rule and bar
victims' recovery on the mistaken belief that a 'marginal incentive curve' was flat, or nearly
so. If a loss must be borne, it is no worse if a 'merely' negligent defendant bears the loss
than an innocent plaintiff absorb the damages.").
171. One such case is Kinsman, and People Express Airlines, Inc. v. ConsolidatedRail
Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985), is another. There, the court declined to apply the economic
loss rule to prevent recovery of losses by an airline when forced to evacuate its terminal
following the negligent release of a chemical from a nearby railroad car. Instead, the court
held that an obligation of due care would exist if a plaintiff could establish "particular
foreseeability," a standard calling for a case-by-case inquiry. Id.at 116. It had this to say
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limit liability have, therefore, an obvious attraction. In sum, their
imprecision, together with ambiguity in the case law, enable courts to
discern and reach appropriate results generally. This is something that the
economic loss rule is incapable of doing.
Let us now return to the specific question of whether lost time claims
should be cognizable under the law of negligence. Once we recognize that
the economic loss rule should not bar such claims, it becomes apparent that
permitting such recovery is supported by those same considerations that
justify tort damages generally. Courts and commentators seeking to provide
normative criterion for the remedial structure of tort law typically fall into
two groups. In one group are the adherents of law and economics, who
argue that the remedial structure should be designed so as to create efficient
incentives.17 In the other group, we find the supporters of corrective
justice, who stress the non-instrumentalist goal of compensating the victims
of wrongdoing.173
Now consider how the two groups would pursue their respective goals
if presented with a claimant who was wrongfully deprived of leisure time.
In this regard, it is important not to lose sight of the simple fact that the
claimant has suffered a real loss. From the perspective of law and
economics, the key is to deter non-cost-justified accidents by creating
incentives for actors to behave more carefully in the future. That is, liability
for negligence should be imposed in those instances where the costs to the
victim were greater than the benefits to the actor. In this respect, it is
essential that the actor internalize the costs of her behavior if we expect to
see an optimal investment in precautions designed to avoid torts. It is only
17 4
then that the tort system can deter excessively risky activity in the future.

about the economic loss rule:
Whatever the original common law justifications for the physical harm rule,
contemporary tort and negligence doctrine allow- indeed, impel -a more thorough
consideration and searching analysis of underlying policies to determine whether a
particular defendant may be liable for a plaintiffs economic losses despite the
absence of any attendant physical harm.
Id.at 111.
172. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1141 n.58 (2007) (suggesting that law and economics dominates
current discussions of tort law).
173. See generally Jules Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 349 (1992) (discussing the overall concept of corrective justice); Ernest Weinrib,
CorrectiveJustice, 77 IowA L. REV. 403 (1992) (same).
174. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 281, 305 (1979) ("One of the main purposes of law, from an economic standpoint, is
the control of externalities .... Property rights and liability rules ... are devices by which
people are given incentives to internalize the costs and benefits of their actions so that an
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This instrumental objective of tort law cannot be achieved if the loss of
leisure time that results from wrongful activity is not reduced to a monetary
value in comparing it to what must be done to reduce the risk that that form
of loss might occur. Only then would the right amount of deterrence be
produced by compelling negligent injurers to make good the victim's
losses.
Corrective justice, on the other hand, is indifferent to the economic
consequences of liability but is concerned with the injustice that results if a
wrong has been committed and the wrong is not "corrected" by imposing
on the wrongdoer a duty to compensate the victim.175 Presumably, a policy
of compensating tort victims for losses would not be fostered by the failure
to take account of lost leisure time. If compensation is the objective, then
the damages awarded to a victim should equal the value of what he has lost.
While it is true that damages for lost leisure time cannot truly "compensate"
in the same way that damages for pecuniary losses can, 7 6 the principle of
corrective justice suggests that courts should provide recovery for this very
real loss. Failure to do so would almost certainly produce
undercompensation.
In its discussion of the cases cited by the plaintiff, the Hannafordcourt
speaks in terms which seem singularly curious. These particular cases
allowed recovery for lost time where the intention to harm was present.
This leads the court to announce that "[b]ecause liability is often more
extensive in cases of intentional torts than those in negligence, intentional
tort cases recognizing recovery for time and effort have little bearing on our

efficient allocation of resources is achieved.").
175. The corrective justice view has been described as follows:
The traditional view-largely unchallenged until recent years-was to look at the
law of torts as a study in corrective justice, as an effort to develop a coherent set of
principles to decide whether this plaintiff was entitled to compensation from this
defendant as a matter of fairness between the parties. Issues of public policy and
social control were of course not absent, but they did not dominate judicial or
academic attitudes either to particular cases or to general theory.
C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS xxii (3d ed. 1977)
(emphasis in original).
176. Damages for pecuniary losses can enable the victim to replace what was lost. For
example, if property is damaged, money can be used to make repairs or purchase a
replacement. Damages for lost leisure time cannot achieve this result. When time is lost, it is
lost forever and no amount of money can actually provide for its replacement. In this sense,
lost leisure time damages share common ground with nonpecuniary damages for pain and
suffering. Neither recovery really makes the victim whole. See Louis L. Jaffe, Damagesfor
PersonalInjury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 222-24 (1953)
(suggesting that damages for pain and suffering provide only consolation or solatium).
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analysis.' 177 To justify its conclusion, the court misplaces its reliance on
two cases. 78 In the first, the intentional nature of the defendant's conduct
formed no part of the plaintiff's prima facie case for damages, but became
relevant only as a means to override a valid affirmative defense of
charitable immunity. 79 The second case involved a claim for mental
distress, a type of harm for which courts have long exhibited a reluctance to
allow recovery. 80 The objections to permitting legal redress for emotional
harm, though, do not necessarily counsel against recovery when negligence
results in lost time. One obvious difference between the two types of claims
supporting this conclusion is that lost time is far more difficult to falsify or
imagine.
The position that liability should sometimes be more extensive in cases
involving intentional harm is sometimes defended on the instrumentalist
ground that there is an increased risk of an erroneous judgment if liability
can be based on something as equivocal as careless behavior. This risk may
have the untoward effect of creating the wrong incentives. Thus, some
activities may be deterred that are not worth deterring. 8 ' The problem with
this argument rests in its failure to recognize that not all legitimate claims
should be barred because a problem of proof may permit a certain
percentage of illegitimate claims to succeed. Indeed, such an argument
proves too much. A fear that the tort of negligence will yield false positives
could be used to override the tort, no matter what the loss. Once it is settled
that there is a tort of negligence for whatever reasons, it is impossible to see
why the plaintiff should be denied a damages claim that she would
otherwise have if the action lay because the harm inflicted was deliberate.
Both intentional wrongs and negligent ones present equal occasions for

177. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 497
(Me. 2010).
178. Id.
179. See Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286 (Me. 2009).
180. See Garland v. Roy, 976 A.2d 940 (Me. 2009). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra
note 135, at 54-66 (discussing claims for the infliction of mental distress).
181. For example, Professor Perlman writes that:
[A]s the amount of potential liability increases, an actor must attach greater
significance to the risk that the substantive legal rule will be applied erroneously
or that he mistakenly will cross the line from no liability to liability. This increased
cost of error may inhibit socially useful activity. The problem is most acute where
liability is based on negligence, because the line between careless and careful
behavior is ambiguous. Courts thus tend to delimit liability more strictly for
negligence than for intentional torts, where in many instances the line between
lawful and unlawful behavior is clear.
Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash
of Tort and ContractDoctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 70-71 (1982).
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corrective justice. In other words, the moral culpability of the wrongdoer
should be irrelevant.
To illustrate, take first the following hypothetical suggested by
Professor Prosser:
Suppose a custodian, whose duty it is to lock up a library at 10 o'clock to
keep people out, decides to lock it up at 9 o'clock instead, and locks in
those who refuse
82 to leave. Is there any doubt that it is false

imprisonment?'

And because it is the intentional tort of false imprisonment, the plaintiff
is entitled to damages, including compensation for lost time. 1 3 Now
suppose the custodian has no actual knowledge that there are still patrons
inside the library, but he could easily have eliminated the risk of accidently
locking someone inside by a quick walk through the building or by a loud
shout announcing the early closing. If we assume that the custodian has
acted negligently in not taking these precautionary steps and that one or
more persons are imprisoned as a result, the Hannaford court would
nonetheless deny damages for lost time. The harm to those who are forced
to spend the night in the library is as before, except that the element of
intention is lacking. The same goals of tort law apply regardless of which of
the causal paradigms-be it intentional or negligent interference with the
plaintiff's person-is applicable to the defendant's conduct.
The foregoing observations about the recovery of lost time damages in
tort leads to the related proposition that these damages should also be
recoverable in contract. 84 Once again, we are seeking damages rules that
are both fair and efficient. The typical remedy for breach of contract is
money damages 18 in an amount sufficient to place the aggrieved party in as
86
good a position as it would have been in had the contract been performed,
or, as is frequently said , to give the aggrieved party "the benefit of its
bargain.' ' 187 This full compensation principle will usually be regarded as
fair because, at least in theory, it provides an adequate performance

182.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, at 53 n.72.
183. See, e.g., Young v. Gormley, (Iowa 1903); Hewlett v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss.
1891); Goodell v. Tower, 58 A. 790 (Vt. 1904).
184. Those who reject the idea that lost time should be viewed as a cognizable harm in
a breach of contract action may justify their position on the ground that the amount involved
is too speculative. This Article will later demonstrate that the case for their recognition can
be made in simple and direct terms. See infra notes 196-221 and accompanying text.
185. Because of the difficulties in forcing people to continue a relationship that they no
longer wish to continue, the law of contracts permits parties to compel performance of
promises through legal means only in those instances when monetary damages are
unsuitable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. n. at 100 (1981).
186. See id at § 344(a); U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2004).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) cmt. a (1981).
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substitute for the aggrieved party. Furthermore, it is economically efficient
because of its incentive effects. The central economic concept that emerges
from a consideration of incentives is that of "efficient breach.' 88
Without entering into the fray about the strengths and weaknesses of
the theory of efficient breach, I will make a few points about its relation to
compensation.' 89 According to this theory, incentives for performance are
efficient if they compel a promisor to balance the cost to him of performing
against the losses to himself and to the promisee that will result if he does
not perform.' 90 This would correctly encourage breach only if the value of
the gain to the promisor is greater than the value of the loss to his
counterparty.' 9 ' If, on the other hand, the promisor's liability for damages
was greater than any benefit to be gained from breaching the contract,
presumably the promisor would elect to perform the contract instead.192 The
chosen result (breach or performance) is defended on the ground that a
"Pareto-superior" allocation of resources results because promisors would
be encouraged to direct their efforts to the most valued use. 193 If aggrieved
promisees are systematically undercompensated, promisors would not
internalize the full value of performance to the promisee and risk too much
breach.'94 Of course, overcompensation would have just the opposite
result. 195

188. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-31 (7th ed.
Aspen 2007).
189. For discussions of various criticisms of the efficient breach theory, see, e.g.,
Daniel Friedman, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil,
Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich
ClassificatoryApparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1018 (1981).
190. See POSNER, supranote 188, at 118-31.
191. See id.
192. For judicial expressions of this idea, see, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841
F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily
blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that his performance is worth more
to someone else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise,
provided he makes good the promisee's actual losses."); Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 64 P.3d 230, 251 (Colo. 2003) ("The theory of 'efficient breach' posits that the purpose
of contract law is not to discourage all breaches. To the contrary, certain breaches, such as
those where the breaching party's gains exceed the injured party's losses, are thought to be
desirable.").
193. In addition to producing an efficient allocation of resources, full compensation
also has the added benefit of encouraging reliance on contract rights because, breach or no
breach, the promisee knows that she will receive the benefit of her bargain.
194. See William S. Dodge, The Casefor Punitive Damages in Contracts,48 DUKE L.J.
629, 664 (1999) ("If the breaching party is not responsible for the nonbreaching party's full
loses, then there is an incentive to breach even when the breach would not be efficient.").
195. This notion accords remarkably with the historical unwillingness of courts to
award punitive damages in breach of contract actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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In sum, the failure of courts to award damages for lost leisure time
involves more than issues of fairness and adequate compensation. There is
also the possibility that this applied rule of damage recovery generates
inefficient incentives to breach or go forward with contract performance, or
to optimally invest in precautions to avoid torts. Providing compensation
for lost time would eliminate this source of inefficiency.
C. The Problem of Measurement
Given the fact that the Hannaford court discounted other cases finding
loss of time to be a cognizable injury because those cases failed to
demonstrate how those damages were being measured, 196 it is next relevant
to inquire how the damage structure might integrate such a claim. The crux
of the analysis that follows is that, although the measurement of
unconventional forms of loss is often difficult, the substitution of market
time for leisure or nonmarket time can provide a solution consistent with
the rules of damages assessment.
Frequently, courts have stated that if the plaintiff fails to prove his
damages "with reasonable certainty," all recovery is denied. 197 For example,
courts have asserted that the profits lost by a new business are too
speculative to permit their recovery. 198 In applying the reasonable certainty
rule's higher standard of proof, however, courts have countenanced a
departure from theory in several categories of litigation where the plaintiff's
proof is as precise and accurate as the situation permits. 199 Perhaps the most

CONTRACTS § 353 (1981). But see Dodge, supra note 194, at 663 ("Allowing a party to

breach a contract and pay damages is not as efficient as forcing that party, with the threat of
punitive damages, to negotiate with the other party for a release from the contract.").
196. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 497
(Me. 2010).
197. See DOBBS, supra note 79, at 149-50. The effect of this rule is "to increase the
injured party's burden of persuasion well beyond the usual one of making out his case by the
'preponderance or greater weight of the evidence."' E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies
for Breach of Contract, 70 COLuM. L. REv. 1145, 1210-11 (1970).
198. See DOBBS, supra note 79, at 154-55. But it would seem that a strong public policy
underlying the substantive law involved may affect the degree of certainty required. Thus,
the Supreme Court has permitted a theater owner to recover lost profits resulting from
defendant's anti-trust violations even though there was great uncertainty regarding their
amount. See generally Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
199. See DOBBS supra note 79, at 151 ("[T]he plaintiff is probably expected to prove his
damages with as much accuracy as is reasonably possible to him, but precision not attainable
in the nature of the claim and circumstances is not ordinarily required."). As one English
court fancifully put it:
As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on . . . as is reasonable,
having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by
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extreme example of an accepted damage assessment for which no certain
metric exists is the pain and suffering award. 2°°
Pain and suffering recovery has long been the subject of many exacting
criticisms. A primary criticism has been that the difficulties of monetizing
intangible loss lead to awards that vary significantly from one case to
another and are not consonant with the compensatory principle of tort
damages. 20 1 Although these arguments seem fairly compelling, courts have
been consistent in their position that the arguments do not warrant abolition
of the pain and suffering award because it does continue to serve several
useful purposes. 20 2 Courts, however, do require that the award be fair and
reasonable, often without offering a real guide for making that
determination. 203 As a consequence, a number of academics have put forth

which the damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and
intelligible principles. To insist upon more would be the vainest pedantry.
Ratcliffe v. Evans, 2 Q.B. 524 (C.A. 1892). Courts also have been known to invoke the
maxim that a wrongdoer cannot complain about computational uncertainty resulting from his
wrongful act. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 102-03 (West 1935).
200. See Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 681 (Cal. 1966) ("Every case which has
considered the issue [of pain and suffering] ... has emphasized the difficulty faced by a jury
in attempting to measure in monetary terms compensation for injuries as subjective as pain
....
.).
201. See generally Jaffe, supra note 176, at 219; Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and
Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 163 (2004);
Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering andBeyond.: Some Thoughts on Recoveryfor Intangible
Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 359 (2006).
202. Pain and suffering damages can be justified as serving at least four distinct
purposes: appeasing both the victim's and society's sense of outrage over the defendant's
behavior; providing a sum out of which to compensate the victim for the expenses of
litigation, including the fees paid to her attorney; deterring both the defendant and others
from engaging in similar conduct in the future, and to provide the victim with the funds
needed to pursue an alternative lifestyle that takes into account her injuries. See DOBBS,
supra note 79, at 550.
203. See, e.g., Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 342 (Cal. 1961) (stating that
an award would be excessive if it "shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the jury"); Tucker v. Lower, 434 P.2d 320, 327 (Kan. 1967) ("[Tjhe
only standard for evaluation is such amount as twelve reasonable persons estimate to be fair
compensation when that amount appears to be in harmony with the evidence and arrived at
without passion or prejudice."); Cuddy v. L & M Equip. Co., 225 N.E.2d 904, 909 (Mass.
1967) (rejecting the argument that plaintiff's reference to possible per diem sums upon
which the jury could calculate damages for pain and suffering were prejudicial). To help
guide the discretion of the jury, California has adopted a model jury instruction that
authorizes the recovery of "[r]easonable compensation for any pain, discomfort, fears,
anxiety and other mental and emotional distress suffered," and then instructs the jury that
"[iln making an award for pain and suffering you should exercise your authority with calm
and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix must be just and reasonable in light of the
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more

Two basic strategies for reform seem to dominate the literature. One is
the idea that pain and suffering awards should be limited to a fixed
percentage of the medical and related expenses. 0 5 The other strategy
involves constructing some sort of schedule of pain and suffering awards
based on the kind of injury and age of the victim. The amounts could be
determined by prior awards of a similar nature20 6 or by a consortium of
experts.20 7 Of course there are problems with both strategies. They may not
always work as well as the reformers said they would- hardly any reform
ever does.20 8 But, I have already noted how arbitrary and capricious the tort
system often is in imposing damage awards for pain and suffering; such
caprice tends to undermine whatever deterrent effects the present system
may otherwise have. If sanctions are to be effective as a deterrent they must
be certain. The foregoing proposals do, at least, meet this criterion.
Are there analogies in the area of pain and suffering to determining
damages for lost leisure time? We should start with the following three

evidence." Cal. Jury Instr.-Civ. 14.13 (2011).
204. There has also been legislative action aimed at making awards more predictable.
Almost 30 states have sought to cap the amount recoverable, typically in medical
malpractice suits. Some of these legislative efforts have, however, been overturned on state
constitutional grounds. See Kevin Sack, Illinois Court Overturns MalpracticeStatute, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A13 ("According to the American Medical Association, courts in 16
states have upheld the laws, while those in 11 states have overturned them.").
205. See, e.g., Marcus Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200
(1958) (proposing that the award should be limited to 50 percent of medical and related
expenses). Interestingly, Judge Posner has argued in favor of a ratio approach, when writing
for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a wrongful death case involving a claim for loss
of consortium damages. See Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The
first step in taking a ratio approach to calculating damages for loss of consortium would be
to examine the ratio [of economic to noneconomic damages] in wrongful-death cases in
which the award of damages was upheld on appeal.").
206. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Beyond Tort
Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damagesfor PersonalInjury, 8 YALE J.ON
REG. 171, 178-79 (1991) ("[T]he middle range of prior awards of a similar nature should be
given 'presumptive' validity.").
207. See, e.g., 2 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY: ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 226 n.30 (1991) (the amounts would be determined
"by a consortium of experienced judges, lawyers, insurers, doctors, and others, whose
conclusions would then be adopted by the state legislature or the state supreme court").
208. The greatest problem with a ratio approach is that a plaintiff with small economic,
but large noneconomic, losses would recover little. Likewise, a scheduling approach suffers
from the questionable belief that all injuries can be fairly categorized. For a valuable critique
of these strategies, see Mark Geistfeld, Placinga Price on Painand Suffering: A Methodfor
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damagesfor Nonmonetary Damages, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773
(1995).
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benchmarks for assigning a dollar value to leisure time. First, whatever
method is selected for use it should not discriminate against plaintiffs with
little or no income.2 0 9 Second, we should embrace the assumption that
everyone values their leisure time equally. That is, we should consider an
approach that is not claimant-specific.21 0 Third, there is a great deal to be
said in favor of providing a formula that can be easily administered to yield
awards that are consistent across cases and in amounts that seem
appropriate to many.
Over the past several decades, there has been a growing recognition
among forensic economists that the enjoyment of life is a component of the
value of life and should be recognized as a separate element of damages in
wrongful death and personal injury cases.
While subtle nuances and
thematic variations exist, there appear to be two basic ways of making this
hedonic calculation. The first method of valuing the enjoyment of life might
best be termed the "willingness-to-pay" ("WTP") approach.21 2 The first step
is to determine what an average person people would pay to have his or her
risk of fatal injury reduced by a very small amount. Economists Michael
Brookshire and Stan Smith have identified a number of sources that can be
consulted for this information. They include:
1) Studies based on data regarding what private citizens spend on items
they use to increase their own safety, such as airbags, smoke
detectors, larger tires and so forth.
2) How much more customers pay to fly on airlines with better safety
reputations and similar consumer expenditures based on safety
differentials in service delivery.

209. Indeed, for this reason, one might legitimately object to a ratio approach to pain
and suffering awards that is based on components of pecuniary injury that includes lost
earnings capacity.
210. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the court in Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways
Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Cal. 1998) was mistaken in its view that "[tihe amount of
compensation could vary dramatically depending on what the [plaintiff] was prevented from
doing ... "Id. at 994 n.6. Whether the plaintiff was deterred from playing golf or attending
the wedding of a close friend or relative should not matter. The whole idea that a judge or
jury can rank the relative value of various activities in a meaningful way is simply
preposterous. No one is an expert on another person's pleasures. The damages in all cases
should be uniform and based on the intrinsic value of leisure time.
211. For an overview of existing case law on the issue of hedonic damages, see supra
notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
212. This method has its genesis in a 1968 article by Thomas Schelling. See generally
Thomas Schelling, The Life You Save May be Your Own, reprinted in THOMAS SCHELLING,
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 113 (Harvard Univ. Press 1984).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 79:757

with greater life
3) How much more workers must be paid to accept21jobs
3
risk, such as coal mining or high beam welding.
By determining what an individual would pay to reduce the risk of
death or injury or the wage premium demanded to accept a position with an
increased risk of death or injury, the intrinsic value of life can be inferred.
For example, if individuals willingly spend $1,000 to reduce the risk of
death by 0.01%, it can be inferred that the whole value of an individual's
life is $10 million ($1,000/0.0001).214
The foregoing whole life value does not, however, measure the value of
specific aspects of life. The next and final step in putting a specific dollar
figure on the enjoyment of life component of an individual's life is to
subtract from the whole life value the present value of household
production and the income stream that would be derived from time spent in
market activities for the remainder of the individual's life expectancy.
This approach to arriving at hedonic value or enjoyment is not without
challenge. For example, wage-risk premium studies assume labor mobility
and that individuals have perfect information about job safety. At least one
2 15
commentator has questioned the accuracy of these twin assumptions.
Another common criticism is that the estimated value of an anonymous or
statistical person is not the same as the value that an individual places on
her own life.2 16 Regardless of the merits of these and other criticisms of the
WTP approach as a basis for measuring the hedonic value of life, it is not a
methodology that is suitable for lost leisure time valuations in the vast run
of cases. One basic point is decisive: it lacks administrative convenience in
application. Whether WTP-based values are derived from wage-risk
studies, consumption studies, or surveys posing hypothetical questions
about risk, the approach requires time-consuming and expensive expert
testimony by forensic economists. These costs may be justified in the highstakes world of wrongful death and serious personal injury, but are hardly
justifiable in the run-of-the-mill leisure time case involving relatively few
hours.

213. MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, EcoNoMIc/HEDONIC DAMAGES: THE
PRACTICE BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 167 (Anderson Pub'n Co. 1990).
214. See, e.g., Glenn Blomquist, Value of Life Saving: Implications of Consumer
Activity, 87 J. POL. ECoN. 540 (1979) (assessing the value of a person's life to be $370,000
based on seatbelt use); Craig A. Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by
Workers on DangerousJobs, 16 J. HUM. RES. 167 (1981) (assessing the value of a person's
life to be $3.2 million based on the premium paid to workers in dangerous jobs).
215. See, e.g., William T. Dickens, Assuming the Can Opener: Hedonic Wage
Estimates and the Value of Life, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 51 (1990).
216. See, e.g., Thomas Havrilesky, The Misapplication of the Hedonic Damages
Concept to Wrongful Death and PersonalInjury Litigation,6 J. FORENSIC ECON. 93 (1993).
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A second approach to estimating the value of life and its component,
the enjoyment of life, rejects the indirect calculation that underlies the WTP
methodology, and substitutes, instead, a direct measurement of three
components of life: work, services, and enjoyment. The important insight
provided by this approach is that, because each person allocates his or her
time so as to maximize total utility, on the margin, the value of each
component has the same price. Thus, it is accurate to say that that price is at
least the market-equivalent wage rate applicable to the individual's actual
or potential employment opportunities. Gary Becker, the 1992 Nobel Prize
winner in economics, observes that "[t]he marginal utility from all uses of
time are equal in equilibrium because they have the same price (w), and the
marginal rate of substitution between time and each good equals the "real"
wage rate, where the price deflator is the price of the good. 2 17 Thus, if an
individual has a current wage rate of $15 per hour, the value of her lost
leisure time would also be estimated at $15 per hour.2 18
By providing an approach that has the advantage of making the value of
leisure time relatively easy to establish, the cumulative method of valuation
may appear, at first blush, to bring us to the end of our pragmatic search for
a suitable method to set damages in lost time cases. Moreover, in addition
to its efficacy, it has the added advantage of keeping courts out of the
business of ranking the worth of various activities. But this approach suffers
from two deficits.
Let us understand first that using an individual's actual wage-rate as a
measuring rod to value lost leisure opportunities raises substantial equality
concerns. To my mind, such an approach is inconsistent with the dignity of
universal human worth by positing that leisure time is worth more to
neurosurgeons than it is to law professors. Why would this be? After all, it
might well be that those with lower paying jobs under difficult conditions
may value their leisure time more than those who toil in high paying
positions that bring with them high degrees of respect and self-satisfaction.
What is needed is a damages rule that is indifferent to the earning
characteristics of different people, but simply seeks to measure lost time in
a manner that is not intractably discriminatory.

217.
218.

GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
For a good discussion of the application of this approach to an injured housewife,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 80 (Little, Brown & Co. 1972). It is
suggested that the appropriate wage-rate should be assessed net of taxes since the return on
nonmarket time is not taxable. Id.Thus, that would be the rate that an individual would
consider relevant when trading between work time and leisure time so as to maximize his
total utility. Because the effect of taxes on the total recovery in the type of case envisioned
by this Article would be de minimis, I suggest that they should be ignored. Their
consideration would only add an unnecessary complicating feature to the calculation. For
these two reasons, I would also ignore the typical work-related expenses of transportation,
clothing, etc.
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Even if I am reluctant to embrace an approach that implicitly rejects the
assumption that everyone enjoys life equally, the notion that earnings in the
market (i.e., "opportunity cost of leisure time") provides the basis for an
acceptable standard of measurement should hardly be dismissed in toto. If it
is just the claimant-specific determination that is troublesome, then why not
simply use the median or mean wage-rate paid by employers in all industry
sectors2 19in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas as the relevant real
wage?
There is still one more step to consider. A disadvantage of lost leisure
valuation based on the composite median or mean wage is that in some
cases-indeed perhaps in most cases-we would have to make an upward
adjustment to the hourly wage-rate of specific individuals to truly reflect
the realities of the marketplace. In an unpublished paper, Melville Wolfson
advances the truly novel notion that leisure time is worth more than
working time.220 He argues that the hourly earnings rate undervalues leisure
time because it neglects to take into account the real possibility of an
overtime premium, which can be time-and-a-half, double-time and
sometimes even triple-time, depending upon the industry. Thus, in his view,
some multiple (1.5, 2.0 or 3.0) of the hourly earnings rate should be used.221
Admittedly, there is room for disagreement about what the multiple for
valuing leisure time ought to be. If, however, tort and contract law are to be
understood from a meliorative perspective, it is clear to me that some
multiple should, in fact, be used. Probably the two most common social
policies promoted by both tort and contract law are the compensation for
losses and the creation of incentives for optimal levels of behavior. When
tort and contract law are assessed in connection with their meliorative
functions, one may question the wisdom of adopting a measure of damages
that increases the likelihood of undercompensation. Other things being

219. A snapshot of these wages can be obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor.
See, e.g., NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES
(May 2010), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oesnat.htm (documenting a median hourly rate
of $16.57 and a mean hourly rate of $21.74). Because the primary purpose of this Article is
to provide a conceptual legal and economic framework for assessing the loss of leisure time,
I leave the choice between the two wage-rates to the court or state legislature. States may
choose to pass statutes as a means of resolving this problem. Statutes prescribing a rate of
interest on claims and judgments provide a workable model. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 2516
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-302 (2011). If a specific dollar amount is selected, legislatures
should pay heed to increases in the wage-rate and increase the statutory amount from timeto-time, as necessary.
220. Professor Wolfson's death prevented him from completing the paper. For an
abstract and Editor's Note explaining his thesis, see Melville Z. Wolfson, Is Leisure Time
Worth More Than Working Time, 14 J. FoRENsIc EcON. 35 (2001).
221. A second reason suggested for using a multiple is that the true yield to a worker
for a marginal hour at work should include the utility or pleasure gained from the act of
working. See id. at 36.
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equal, the wrongdoer should bear the slight risk that the specific multiple
chosen might overvalue leisure time. Without this kind of approach, it is
hard to see that the policies of contract and tort law can be implemented on
a large scale. I need not now assess the relative strength of these
multipliers. Nor need I conclude whether the selection should be by the
court or legislature. None of this is necessary to understand the more central
point: the lost leisure valuation should posit an equal quality of life for all
individuals.
IV. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have attempted to demonstrate some of the deep flaws
in the reluctance of courts to award damages for lost leisure time,
particularly in breach of contract cases. This reluctance, coupled with the
fact that it adds to the pervasive undercompensation of contract plaintiffs is
not without social significance.222 I have sought to demonstrate that there
are strong policy grounds for setting damages at an amount that equals the
value of what the plaintiff has lost. The two most basic of these are to
compensate the aggrieved party and to deter conduct that brings about more
harm than good. I have attempted to show that the present structure of
damages, by not giving much attention to claims for lost personal time, has
created the possibility of a divergence between loss and compensable
damages, and is thus insensitive to these policy grounds. In this Article, I
offer a conceptual framework based on this observation. Finally, I have
argued that existing techniques for measuring leisure time are either
administratively cumbersome or are anti-egalitarian. I propose a technique
that is narrowly tailored to respond to these two deficiencies.
The lack of judicial and academic attention to lost leisure time
situations is in some sense astonishing, considering the plethora and
diversity
of contexts
in whichcommon
this typelawof position
loss is likely
occur. 2 23 of
It
suggests that
the traditional
againstto recovery

222. Undercompensation of contract plaintiffs results, in no small part, from the
continued adherence of courts to the American rule on attorneys' fees. Unless the contract or
a statute provides otherwise, each party is ultimately responsible to compensate her own
attorney. See generally Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1984). For tort plaintiffs, on the other hand, punitive damages and pain and suffering
awards can help ease the burden of litigation expenses.
223. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. Another example of an everyday
scenario that implicates such a nonpecuniary loss involves a frustrated consumer seeking to
rectify a problem caused by a commercial provider of goods or services. For example, in a
telephone interview, Richmond, Virginia attorney Anne Stratton explained that a lawsuit she
had filed against Verizon for time spent seeking to correct a variety of billing errors was
dismissed because the court refused to recognize that lost time was a compensable injury.
Telephone Interview with Anne Stratton, Attorney (Jan. 8, 2012).
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nonpecuniary damages generally has a powerful hold on our legal intuition.
A re-evaluation of this slighted area would be good public policy and, it's
about time.

